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APPELLANT'S PETITON FOR REHEARING 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing in this case on the subject of attorney's fees 
awarded by the trial court. 
n 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
In this case this Court held that the attorney's fee awarded by the trial 
court was based on an improper standard, i.e. ten percent of the amount of the 
deed of trust in a foreclosure case. However, because counsel had successfully 
objected to testimony by counsel for Plaintiff as to the number of hours worked, 
the Supreme Court allowed the exhorbitant fee to stand. 
m 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent's attorney, in the case below attempted to prove the amount of 
a reasonable attorney's fee in this foreclosure action by: 
1. Offering allegedly expert testimony of Ray Ivie that in a foreclosure 
action a reasonable attorney's fee is always ten percent of the amount of the trust 
deed note. The Note was for $265,770, making the fee $26,577. This testimony 
was received over counsel's strenuous objections. 
2. Plaintiff's attorney attempted to take the stand himself as a witness 
to testify as to the nature and extent of his work. Jewkes' attorney objected on 
the ground that an attorney may not be a witness in a case in which he also acts as 
counsel. The court sustained the objection. AID's attorney did not make an offer 
of proof and did not attempt to prove the amount or value of his services from any 
other source. 
IV 
ARGUMENT 
The action of the Supreme Court in this case is a novel one. One cannot 
help but be amused at the spectacle of an attorney who is hoist by hi.s own 
petard. To see an attorney whose objection is used to punish him for his too 
clever (or too stupid) by half interference with the proof of his opponent's case 
may make us smile. 
However, the function of this court is not to punish a perhaps untimely or 
ill considered objection, but rather to do justice. Is it justice to require Mr. & 
Mrs. Jewkes, already financially distressed defendants in a foreclosure case, to 
pay a sum more than $20,000.00 in excess of a reasonable attorney's fee because 
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their counsel, by successfully objecting, had persuaded the trial court that 
evidence tendered on the subject of attorney's fees was incompetent? 
One can hardly argue that an objection sustained by the trial judge is 
frivolous, and therefore this Court cannot be attempting to punish counsel for 
making a frivolous objection. The Supreme Court, in attempting to punish counsel 
for objecting to what it must deem to be competent evidence, has erred in at least 
three particulars: 
1. It has made counsel and not the trial court the final judge of the 
admissibility of evidence; 
2. It has made counsel responsible for allowing the opposition to prove 
its case; 
3. It has ruled that when a party fails to prove its case in the trial court 
with competent evidence, incompetent evidence may be used to reach a result 
that is manifestly unjust. 
Counsel has been unable to find any case or commentary which sustains the 
result reached by the Supreme Court in this case. In his opinion, Justice 
Zimmerman has cited Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P2d 162 (Utah 1981) and 
Hickman v. Houghton Elevator Co., 268 Or. 192, 195, 519 P2d 369, 373 (1974). 
Even a superficial analysis of these cases in di ca tes that they do not support the 
proposition for which they are cited. 
In Kohler the attorney who had tendered the evidence in question was 
contending on appeal that certain evidence should have been accepted as an 
exc•eµtion to the hearsay rule. However, the evidence had been excluded at trial 
for lack of foundation and the attorney tendering the evidence did not urge its 
admissability at trial on the grounds urged on appeal. The trial court observed 
that if evidence is excluded on one ground and the evidence may be admissable OP 
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another ground, the attorney offering the evidence must specify the correct 
ground at trial, citing McCormick on Evidence, p. 112 (1972) as follows: 
If counsel specifies a purpose for which the proposed evidence 
is inadmisable and the judge excludes, counsel cannot complain of 
the ruling on appeal though it could have been rightly admitted for 
another purpose. 
Thus, the exclusion of the evidence was sustained. 
In addition, in Kohler the court held that the trial court had correctly 
decided the case on the basis of the evidence introduced which was sufficient to 
enable the court to reach its verdict. 
The instant case differs from the Kohler case in at least two respects: 
1. The appellate court in Kohler held that the trial court had reached a 
correct result. In this case the Utah Supreme Court has held that the trial court 
used an impermissible standard and thus reached an incorrect result. The court 
says, at page 3 of the slip opinions, ''In the instant case, the trial court failed to 
apply the appropriate standard in assessing attorney's fees." 
2. The excluded evidence was tendered by the party seeking to reverse 
the holding, rather than the successful attorney at trial. In this case, the trial 
court refused to admit evidence which might have assisted it in arriving at a 
correct decision. There is, however, no indication that the trial court's attorney 
fee award would in any way have been different had AID's attorney been allowed 
to testify. Thus counsel did not prevent a correct verdict by his objection. The 
state of the record on the subject of attorney's fees in the trial court was that 
improper evidence had been received stating that a reasonable attorney's fee in a 
$265,000.00 foreclosure action was 10%. No other evidence was admitted. Thu>. 
on the state of the record, the trial court should have ruled that no competent 
evidence existed on the record and then taken one of two actions: (a) award no 
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8 ttorney's fees on the ground that no competent evidence as to the amount of a 
reeionable attorney's fee had been introduced, or; (b) used its own evaluation of 
the services rendered in the case and awarded fees based on that evaluation. It 
did neither. 
As in the Kohler case, counsel for Plaintiff in this case failed to take the 
proper actions which would have enabled him to introduce competent evidence of 
the number of hours worked. He did not, as the Utah Rules of Evidence require 
make an offer of proof (see old Rule 5, then in effect) 
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or 
decision based thereon be reversed by reason of the erroneous 
exclusion of evidence unless (a) it appears of record that the 
proponent of the evidence either made known the substance of the 
vidence in a form and by a method approved by the judge, or 
indicated the substance of the expected evidence by questions 
indicating the desired answers •... 
Counsel for AID did not make an offer of proof. Neither did he try to prove the 
hours he worked (as he easily could have done) by calling an employee from his 
office and offering his time records under the business records exception. 
What this court has held is that plaintiff's counsel, though he failed to 
introduce competent evidence, is entitled to an exorbitant and unjust fee based on 
improper evidence and an error of the trial court in relying on such evidence. 
In addition to Kohler, the court cited Hickman, supra, in support of its 
decision to let the trial court's error stand. Hickman, again does not support the 
court's action in this case. In Hickman the trial court had rejected a special jury 
verdict on the ground that it had been reached contrary to the trial court's 
I<istructions. Counsel for defendant contended on appeal that the verdict should 
hAve been accepted by the trial court. However, the defendant's attorney had 
failed to ask the trial court to accept the verdict, asking instead for a mistrial. 
The Oregon Supreme Court refused to grant relief to defendant on the ground that 
he had failed to ask for such relief in the trial court. 
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Once again we do not have a case like the present one. In this case the 
court has held that counsel objects at this peril to evidence offered by the other 
side and he is not insulated by the fact that the court has determined his objection 
to be valid. He is charged with the responsibility of foreseeing all possible 
consequences of his action. If he makes an error in making an instantaneous 
decision which can obligate him to bear his opponent's burden of proof, he may 
wind up with an erroneous verdict which is sustained on appeal because his 
objection prevented the introduction of evidence which, though the trial court 
may ignore it, the appellate court may use as a grounds for reversal. 
Rule 104 of the current Utah Rules of Evidence states, in pertinent part: 
"Preliminary questions concerning the ... admissability of evidence shall be 
determined by the court." Thus, counsel is not responsible for an erroneous ruling 
by the court concerning admissibility. Making counsel responsible for errors in 
admission of evidence would be too heavy a burden. Counsel must bear the weight 
of proving his own case, but cannot be charged with responsibility for allowing or 
assisting his opponent to prove his. The side which fails to prove its case must 
bear the cost of such failure, whether or not it has been triggered by an objection 
from opposing counsel. 
When, as in this case, the failure of proof is compounded by failing to make 
an offer of proof and failure to use a convenient alternative method of proof, 
Plaintiff must bear and loss resulting from inability to persuade the court of the 
admissability of tendered service. 
CONCLUSION 
It would be unjust to allow a trial court error to stand simply be ca use the 
trial court could have reached a correct result if it had admitted and based its 
6 
.. ,"lf' upon evidence excluded in response to objection. Sustaining an unjust 
-,111 ,5 not an acceptable means of punishing counsel for an objection the court 
ocn1s improper. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
H. Hal Visick "'" 
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